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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses how shareholders may bring derivative claims to
challenge corporate independent political expenditures they believe are detri-
mental to the corporation. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v.
FEC1 removes the prohibition on corporate independent political expenditures
and allows companies to spend unlimited sums to expressly advocate the elec-
tion or defeat of a political candidate.2 A recent case from the Montana
Supreme Court, Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General, held
that Citizens United did not apply to state elections;3 however, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court in
American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock.4 The U.S. Supreme Court
held that “Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment [in Western Tradi-
tion Partnership] either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to
meaningfully distinguish that case.”5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit in SpeechNow.org v. FEC6 and Emily’s List v. FEC7 established that
1 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The Court held that “the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate iden-
tity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or
for-profit corporations.” Id. at 913. It is important to note that the Citizens United decision
did not alter the Congressional prohibitions on direct corporate or union contributions to
candidates as upheld by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Id. at 908.
2 See id. at 913. Independent political expenditure is defined as “an expenditure by a person
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and that is not
made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the
candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or
its agents.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006).
3 W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2011).
4 Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
5 Id.
6 SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
7 Emily’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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groups that sponsor independent campaign advocacy8 (“Super PACs”) can col-
lect unlimited contributions from their supporters.9 Subsequently, in July 2010,
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) issued an Advisory Opinion stating
that Super PACs “may solicit and accept unlimited contributions from individu-
als, political committees, corporations, and labor organizations.”10
Based on the case law discussed above, corporations are no longer
restrained from engaging in independent political spending. This issue has
taken center stage in American politics, particularly during the 2012 presiden-
tial primaries and general election. “The demand for corporate political dollars
has mushroomed in tandem with the dramatically increasing costs of recent
American political campaigns.”11
In response to the Citizens United decision, members of Congress pro-
posed legislation to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The
Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections (DIS-
CLOSE) Act stated that its purpose was to “prohibit foreign influence in Fed-
eral elections, to prohibit government contractors from making expenditures
with respect to such elections, and to establish additional disclosure require-
ments with respect to spending in such elections.”12 Democrats introduced the
DISCLOSE Act in the House of Representatives on April 29, 2010,13 and in
the Senate on July 21, 2010.14 But the bill died in the Senate.15 Two years later,
Democrats re-introduced the legislation as the DISCLOSE Act of 2012.16 The
Senate Republican filibuster again blocked the bill.17
Additional reasons that corporate campaign spending is an important issue
include the number of people it affects and the amount of money involved.
“Roughly half of American households own stocks, many through mutual
funds or 401(k) retirement accounts. ‘Corporate money’ in a publicly traded
8 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006) (defining what “independent [campaign] expenditure[s]”
are).
9 FEC Approves Advisory Opinions for Independent Expenditure Committees, OMB
WATCH (July 27, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11164.
10 FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11 (July 22, 2010), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/
AO%202010-11.pdf.
11 SEC Comment, Petition to Require Public Companies to Disclose Corporate Political
Spending File No. 4-637, Dec. 21, 2011, available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/3bd0c2824998
729956_9km6ib1hx.pdf.
12 DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010), 2009 CONG US HR 5175 (Westlaw).
13 Id.
14 DISCLOSE Act, S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010), 2009 CONG US S 3628 (Westlaw).
15 See Rosalind S. Helderman, DISCLOSE Act, New Donor Transparency Law, Blocked in
Senate, WASH. POST POL. (July 16, 2012, 6:45 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
2chambers/post/disclose-act-new-donor-transparency-law-blocked-in-senate/2012/07/16/gJ
QAbm7WpW_blog.html. Cloture is required to move past a Senate filibuster or the threat of
a filibuster and takes a three-fifths vote. In practice, most bills must pass cloture to move
forward in the Senate. See RICHARD S. BETH & STANLEY BACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 9–11 (2003).
16 DISCLOSE Act of 2012, H.R. 4010, 112th Cong. § 1 (2012), 2011 CONG US HR 4010
(Westlaw); DISCLOSE Act of 2012, S. 3369, 112th Cong. § 1 (2012), 2011 CONG US S
3369 (Westlaw).
17 Ted Barrett, Senate Republicans Block DISCLOSE Act for Second Straight Day, CNN
(July 17, 2012, 8:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/17/politics/senate-disclose-act/
index.html.
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company is in part made up of investments from shareholders. Thus, corporate
spending is in reality the spending of investors’ money.”18 A 2010 study con-
ducted by The Sunlight Foundation19 calculated the effect of Citizens United
on the 2010 midterm election and found that “the decision was responsible for
adding $126 million in undisclosed spending by outside groups and $60 million
in disclosed spending by outside groups to the midterm election.”20 In the 2010
mid-term elections, “campaign spending by outside groups increased more than
400% from the 2006 mid-term election to nearly $300 million.”21 If such
spending increased at the same rate in the 2012 election cycle, corporate politi-
cal expenditures will total more than $1 billion.22 As of July 2012, campaign
spending had actually surpassed the $1 billion mark and experts predict that the
final total could be as high as $3 billion.23
This raises several important questions: Even though corporations have
the power to engage in independent political spending, is it wise for those cor-
porations to do so? What if shareholders believe that corporate spending on
political activity is detrimental to the corporation? Will shareholders be
informed if the corporation has engaged in corporate spending on political
activity? What options are available to minority shareholders who disagree with
a corporation’s political expenditures?
This Article endeavors to answer these questions and discusses how share-
holders can use derivative claims of corporate waste to challenge independent
political expenditures that they believe are detrimental to the corporation. The
Article begins by discussing the history of the corporate waste doctrine and
looks at the standard for pleading a claim of corporate waste. The Article then
transitions into a discussion of statutory and case law defining corporate discre-
tion to refrain from profit-maximizing activity, primarily looking at charitable
donations.
18 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders a Voice,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, at 5 (2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/54a676e481f019bfb8_b
vm6ivakn.pdf (internal citations omitted).
19 The Sunlight Foundation is a non-profit organization with the goal of increasing trans-
parency and accountability in the United States government. See Our Mission, SUNLIGHT
FOUNDATION, http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
20 Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for Economic Expres-
sion, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 60 (2012) (citing Paul Blumenthal, The Citizens United
Effect: 40 Percent of Outside Money Made Possible by Supreme Court Ruling, SUNLIGHT
FOUNDATION (Nov. 4, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/11/04/the-
citizens-united-effect-40-percent-of-outside-money-made-possible-by-supreme-court-ruling/
).
21 Andrew C. Byrnes & Cortlin H. Lannin, I Went Down to the Crossroads: Lifting the
Blindfold About the Origin of 501(c)(4) Political Advertisements, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 481, 483
(2011).
22 See 12 Months After: The Effects of Citizens United on Elections and the Integrity of the
Legislative Process, PUBLIC CITIZEN 9 (2011), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizens-
United-20110113.pdf [Hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN]; See also Anne Tucker, Rational Coer-
cion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105,
1127–29 (2011) (“Citizens United has established an environment that exacerbates the pres-
sure on corporations to participate politically through independent expenditures.”).
23 Fredreka Schouten, Presidential Campaign Fundraising Surpasses $1 Billion, USA
TODAY (July 19, 2012, 10:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-07-
19/presidential-campaign-fundraising/56347840/1.
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The Article then discusses the issue of the lack of transparency of a corpo-
ration’s political expenditures and the evolution of case law concerning share-
holders using the corporate waste doctrine to invalidate corporate political
expenditures.24 The Article suggests that shareholders file a request for corpo-
rate records as a prerequisite to filing a derivative action and provides argu-
ments shareholders should make when challenging corporate independent
political expenditures. The Article concludes by discussing approaches that
courts may use to determine the “benefit” and “business purpose” of these inde-
pendent political expenditures and proposes a model corporate political expen-
diture program, including creation of a Political Spending Compliance
Committee.
II. CORPORATE WASTE DOCTRINE
A. History and Evolution
The Supreme Court first recognized the corporate waste doctrine in 1933
in Rogers v. Hill.25 In Rogers, a shareholder filed suit to compel corporate
officers to account for money received as extra compensation and to enjoin
further payments.26 The Court held that corporate waste occurs “[i]f a bonus
payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is given,” noting
that “it is in reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders have no power
to give away corporate property against the protest of the minority.”27
The corporate waste doctrine has continued to evolve since the seminal
decision in Rogers. In McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co.,28 the U.S.
District Court of Maryland held that
[i]f the chosen directors, without interests in conflict with the interest of stockholders,
act in good faith in fixing salaries or incurring other expenses, their judgment will not
ordinarily be reviewed by the courts, however unwise or mistaken it may appear; but
this is far from saying that equity will refuse to redress the wrong done to a stock-
holder by the action or policy of directors . . . which operates to their own personal
advantage, without any corresponding benefit to the corporation under their
control.29
In Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,30 the Delaware Supreme Court
held that “[s]ince a gift may be a gift in part only, a totally inadequate consider-
ation, of course, invokes the same principle as the absence of any at all.”31 In
Michelson v. Duncan,32 the Delaware Supreme Court held that
24 The Article focuses on Delaware law. See, e.g., Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d
971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“[C]ourts of other states commonly look to Dela-
ware law . . . for aid in fashioning rules of corporate law.”).
25 See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); see also Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth
$1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH.
L. REV. 689, 717–720 (2010).
26 Rogers, 289 U.S. at 584–85.
27 Id. at 591–92.
28 McQuillen v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939).
29 Id. at 651 (quoting Wight v. Heublein, 238 F. 321, 324 (4th Cir. 1916)).
30 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952).
31 Id. at 665 (citing Rogers, 289 U.S. at 582).
32 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
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[t]he essence of a claim of waste of corporate assets is the diversion of corporate
assets for improper or unnecessary purposes. Although directors are given wide lati-
tude in making business judgments, they are bound to act out of fidelity and honesty
in their roles as fiduciaries. . . . It is common sense that a transfer for no considera-
tion amounts to a gift or waste of corporate assets.33
In Glazer v. Zapata Corp.,34 the Delaware Chancery Court held that
“[d]irectors are guilty of corporate waste, only when they authorize an
exchange that is so one[-]sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judg-
ment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration”
and “[i]f reasonable, informed minds might disagree on the question . . . a
reviewing court will not attempt to itself evaluate the wisdom of the bargain or
the adequacy of the consideration.”35
In Lewis v. Vogelstein,36 the Delaware Chancery Court held that corporate
waste “entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so dispropor-
tionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might
be willing to trade” and that a claim for corporate waste “is associated with a
transfer of corporate assets that serves no corporate purpose; or for which no
consideration at all is received. Such a transfer is in effect a gift.”37 In Sample
v. Morgan, the Delaware Chancery Court held that “[c]laims of waste are
sometimes misunderstood as being founded on something other than a breach
of fiduciary duty. . . . [T]he doctrine of waste is a residual protection for stock-
holders that polices the outer boundaries of the broad field of discretion
afforded directors by the business judgment rule.”38
B. Standard for Pleading
Under Delaware law, plaintiffs must “make a pre-suit demand on the com-
pany’s board that it investigate and evaluate whether to bring the claims or to
plead particularized facts demonstrating legal excuse from the demand require-
ment.”39 Demand-excuse allegations “must comply with stringent requirements
of factual particularity that differ substantially from the permissive notice
pleadings [and the requirements are] not satisfied by conclusory statements or
mere notice pleading.”40 The test for demand futility is a two-fold test:
The first prong of the futility rubric is “whether, under the particularized facts
alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that . . . the directors are disinterested and
independent.” The second prong is whether the pleading creates a reasonable doubt
33 Id. at 217.
34 Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176 (Del. Ch. 1993).
35 Id. at 183.
36 Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).
37 Id. at 336.
38 Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007).
39 Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Complaint at 7, Teamsters Local 237
Additional Sec. Benefit Fund v. McCarthy, No. 2011-cv-197841, 2011 WL 4836230, at *3
(Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2011).
40 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). It is important to note that the plaintiffs
are not required to plead evidence, only “particularized factual statements that are essential
to the claim.” Id.
140 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:134
that “the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment.”41
In the context of a claim for corporate waste, plaintiffs’ pleadings must
“meet the stringent requirements of the waste test, i.e., ‘an exchange that is so
one[-]sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could con-
clude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.’ ”42 In In re
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court
held that “plaintiffs [must] plead facts overcoming the presumption of good
faith by showing ‘an exchange that is so one[-]sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received ade-
quate consideration.’ ”43
Delaware courts have established a very high burden for shareholders fil-
ing derivative claims for corporate waste.44 In White v. Panic, the Delaware
Supreme Court found that “a corporate waste claim must fail if ‘there is any
substantial consideration received by the corporation, and . . . there is a good
faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile.’ ”45 The
court also stated that even if the transaction appears to be unreasonably risky,
that is not enough to meet the high burden imposed on plaintiffs, and noted that
“ ‘courts are ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration under
the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business
risk.’ ”46
However, even though there is a high burden for a claim of corporate
waste to succeed, there is case law and empirical evidence showing that Dela-
ware courts may permit corporate waste claims to survive the demand stage
with little support. In Michelson, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
“[c]laims of gift or waste of corporate assets are seldom subject to disposition
by summary judgment; and when there are genuine issues of fact as to the
existence of consideration, a full hearing is required.”47 In Harbor Finance
Partners v. Huizenga, the Delaware Chancery Court found that claims for cor-
porate waste “with no genuine likelihood of success can make it to discovery
and perhaps to trial.”48 In Schreiber v. Carney, even though the claim for cor-
porate waste was barely supported by the record, the Delaware Chancery Court
was reluctant to grant summary judgment “without giving [the] plaintiff an
opportunity to further develop his claim.”49 The court further found that
41 Id. at 256 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (1984)).
42 Id. at 263 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch.
1998)).
43 In re Citigroup Inc. Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 137 (Del. Ch. 2009) (quoting
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
44 Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that a claim for waste
must meet “an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff”); see also Binks
v. DSL.net, Inc., No. 2823-VCN, 2010 WL 1713629, at *12 (Del. Ch. 2009) (Corporate
waste claims are reserved only for the “rare unconscionable case where directors irrationally
squander or give away corporate assets.” (citation omitted)).
45 White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 (Del. 2001) (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
46 Id. (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
47 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979).
48 Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 902 (Del. Ch. 1999).
49 Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 27 (Del. Ch. 1982).
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whether there has been a waste of corporate assets is a question of fact and is
not answered by any bright-line rule.50
An empirical study completed by Professors Randall S. Thomas and Ken-
neth J. Martin in 2001 examined all shareholder derivative cases filed in Dela-
ware between 1912 and 2000. The study found that corporate waste claims
succeeded in 29% of cases.51 The study defined success as “defeating a motion
to dismiss for failure to make demand, [defeating] a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim . . . [defeating] a motion for summary judgment, or prevail-
ing at trial or on appeal.”52 The empirical evidence showed that even though
plaintiffs in corporate waste cases faced a high burden, almost one-third of
corporate waste claims still advanced past the demand stage. It is also impor-
tant to note that these numbers do not include claims that were settled outside
of court.
III. CORPORATE DISCRETION TO REFRAIN FROM PROFIT-
MAXIMIZING ACTIVITY
In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the Michigan Supreme Court stated that a
“corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders” and that “[t]he powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.”53 However, scholars have also opined “that business is permitted and
encouraged by the law primarily because it is of service to the community
rather than because it is a source of profit to its owners.”54 Throughout history,
there has been controversy over the nature and purpose of corporations.55 It is
important to note that no corporate statute has stated that the sole purpose of a
corporation is to maximize profits for its shareholders.56
A. Statutory Law
“[E]very state has enacted a corporate statute giving managers explicit
authority to donate corporate funds for charitable purposes.”57 Section 122(9)
of Delaware’s General Corporation Law provides that “[e]very corporation cre-
ated under this chapter shall have power to: [m]ake donations for the public
welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war
or other national emergency in aid thereof.”58 Twenty-three states and the Dis-
50 Id.
51 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility, WASH. U. L. REV. 569, 608 (2001). This number is compared to 27%
for duty of care claims and 30% for duty of loyalty claims. Id. at 608–09.
52 Id. at 583.
53 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
54 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1149 (1932).
55 See Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Better, More
Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 438, 439
(2007).
56 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 763 (2005).
57 Id.
58 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2006).
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trict of Columbia have provisions which are nearly identical to the Delaware
statute.59 Nineteen states have provisions governing donations that further the
business and affairs of the corporation, which may include political
expenditures.60
It is important to note that none of these statutes include any limits on the
size of the expenditure or restrictions as to whom the expenditure is given, and
these statutes provide no guidance as to the reasonableness of such expendi-
tures.61 This is a critical distinction that will be made throughout this Article
because the question is not whether corporations have the ability to engage in
independent political spending, but whether that political spending serves no
corporate purpose and whether that political spending is detrimental to the cor-
poration. As will be discussed later in this Article, that is where the sharehold-
ers must focus their claims.62
B. Cases
Several cases have discussed whether directors of a corporation can justify
a decision based upon non-economic reasons and whether those decisions nega-
tively affected the corporation.
1. Shlensky v. Wrigley
In Wrigley, shareholders brought a derivative suit in Illinois against the
directors of Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. (“Cubs”) for negligence
and mismanagement.63 The shareholders alleged that the Cubs were sustaining
operating losses from inadequate attendance at Cubs’ home games.64 The
shareholders believed that the poor attendance was due to the fact that Wrigley
Field did not have lights and could not host games at night.65 The shareholders
stated the Cubs had not installed lights at Wrigley Field because the Cubs
believed “that the installation of lights and night baseball games will have a
deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood.”66 The shareholders
specifically alleged that the Cubs were “acting for a reason or reasons contrary
and wholly unrelated to the business interests of the corporation; that such arbi-
59 Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and
Power in Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1115 n.31 (1997)
(“These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas (except requires board approval
of charitable contributions), Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Mary-
land (except requires board approval of charitable contributions), Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas and West Virginia.”).
60 Id. (“The states . . . include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Ver-
mont, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.”).
61 See id. at 1111–14.
62 See infra Part VI(A).
63 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 778.
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trary and capricious acts constitute mismanagement and waste of corporate
assets.”67
The Illinois Appellate Court held that the shareholders’ allegations were
just conclusions and not based on well-pleaded facts.68 The court could not find
that the motives assigned to the Cubs’ directors were contrary to the best inter-
ests of the corporation and the shareholders.69 The court stated that:
[T]he effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well be considered by a director
who was considering the patrons who would or would not attend the games if the
park were in a poor neighborhood . . . the long run interest of the corporation in its
property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood
from deteriorating.70
The Illinois Appellate Court also held that the shareholders failed to allege
any damage to the corporation.71 The court found that “factors other than
attendance affect the net earnings or losses” and no allegation was made to
show that the lights would have provided a net benefit to the corporation.72
Based upon these facts, the court affirmed the shareholders’ claims dismissal.73
2. A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company v. Barlow
In Barlow, shareholders brought a derivative suit in New Jersey against
the directors of the A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company (“Smith Manufactur-
ing”) alleging the corporation did not have the power to make a $1,500 dona-
tion to Princeton University.74 The shareholders specifically alleged that Smith
Manufacturing’s “certificate of incorporation does not expressly authorize the
contribution and under common-law principles the company does not possess
any implied or incidental power to make it.”75
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the donation was valid.76 The
court found that the donation was not made indiscriminately or in furtherance
of personal rather than corporate ends.77 The court further found that the dona-
tion “was made to a preeminent institution of higher learning, was modest in
amount and well within the limitations imposed by the statutory enactments,
and was voluntarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid the public
welfare and advance the interests of the . . . corporation.”78
3. Theodora Holding Corporation v. Henderson
In Henderson, shareholders brought a derivative suit in Delaware against
the directors of the Theodora Holding Corporation (“Theodora Holding”) alleg-
ing that losses sustained by the corporation were the result of certain transac-
67 Id.
68 Id. at 781.
69 Id. at 780.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 780–81.
73 Id. at 781.
74 A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 582–83 (N.J. 1953).
75 Id. at 583.
76 Id. at 590.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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tions, including a charitable donation of $528,000 to the Alexander Dawson
Foundation.79
The Delaware Chancery Court found that for a “corporate charitable or
educational gift to be valid [it] must merely be within reasonable limits both as
to amount and purpose.”80 The court held that the test to determine the validity
of a corporate donation is a test of reasonableness and that “the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations furnish
a helpful guide.”81 The court found that the donation made in this case,
$528,000, fell within the federal tax deduction limitation of 5% of the corpora-
tion’s income.82 The court further found that
the relatively small loss of immediate income otherwise payable to plaintiff and the
corporate defendant’s other stockholders, had it not been for the gift in question, is
far out-weighed by the overall benefits flowing from the placing of such gift in chan-
nels where it serves to benefit those in need of philanthropic or educational support,
thus providing justification for large private holdings, thereby benefiting plaintiff in
the long run.83
4. Kahn v. Sullivan
In Kahn, shareholders brought a derivative suit in Delaware against the
directors of the Occidental Petroleum Company (“Occidental”) challenging a
decision by Occidental’s board of directors, through a special committee of
Occidental’s outside directors, to make a charitable donation for the purpose of
constructing and funding an art museum.84 The shareholders alleged that the
donations did not serve a corporate purpose and constituted a waste of corpo-
rate assets.85
The Delaware Supreme Court held that Occidental’s donation was reason-
able and not excessive.86 The court stated that “not every charitable gift consti-
tutes a valid corporate action,” but that “given the net worth of Occidental, its
annual net income before taxes, and the tax benefits to Occidental, . . . the
gift . . . was within the range of reasonableness.”87 The court further found that
Occidental received an economic benefit in the form of good will from the
charitable donation and that the corporation would gain an economic benefit
from “being able to utilize the [m]useum, adjacent to its corporate headquar-
ters, in the promotion of its business.”88
IV. CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDITURES
Shareholders may file derivative claims of corporate waste against direc-
tors of corporations to challenge corporate independent political expenditures
79 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 399–400 (Del. Ch. 1969).
80 Id. at 404.
81 Id. at 405; See also I.R.C § 170 (2006).
82 Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405.
83 Id.
84 Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 50 (Del. 1991).
85 Id. at 61.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 62.
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that they believe are detrimental to the corporation.89 However, most share-
holders are not even aware of their corporation’s political expenditures largely
because corporations are not required to report them to shareholders in any
specific public financial filing.90 It is also important to note that corporations
do not typically volunteer information concerning political expenditures.91
“Investor activists want companies to disclose how they spend corporate trea-
sury money on politics not only because this is their money, but also because of
their generally-held belief that political spending can pose risks to shareholder
value.”92
A. Transparency of Corporate Political Expenditures
Federal securities laws do not require that shareholders receive informa-
tion concerning corporate political spending.93 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) does not have any regulations requiring disclosure by pub-
licly-traded companies of their political spending to shareholders.94 Even for
political expenditures that are properly reported to a government agency, such
as the FEC, corporations are not required by law to share that information with
shareholders in an accessible way, such as in an annual report.95 “Political con-
tributions are generally not disclosed to the board or shareholders, nor are polit-
ical expenditures generally subject to oversight as part of a corporation’s
internal controls.”96 “Corporations are [also] not required to report or account
for corporate funds donated through third parties.”97
As U.S. law stands, “corporate managers can spend corporate money on
politics without notifying shareholders either before or after the fact and they
can make this political spending without any authorization from sharehold-
ers.”98 A 2008 survey, conducted by The Conference Board,99 found that 73%
of the 255 directors surveyed wrongly believed that corporations were required
89 See Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[T]he doctrine of waste is a
residual protection for stockholders that polices the outer boundaries of the broad field of
discretion afforded directors by the business judgment rule.”).
90 Heidi Welsh & Robin Young, Corporate Governance of Political Expenditures: 2011
Benchmark Report on S&P 500 Companies, SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INSTITUTE (Si2)
33–34 (2011), http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Political_Spending_Report_Nov_10_2011.
pdf (“Two-thirds of the companies that spend shareowner money fail to tell their investors
where and how it is spent.”).
91 Id. at 34, 43.
92 Id. at 31.
93 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 18, at 12.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1613 (2006).
97 PAUL DENICOLA ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE POLITI-
CAL ACTIVITY: EMERGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES 11 (2010), available at http://
www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=A/GetDocumentAction/id/4084 [hereinafter
CORPORATE POLITICAL HANDBOOK].
98 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 18, at 10.
99 The Conference Board is a non-profit, global, independent business membership and
research association. See About Us, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, http://www.conference-board.
org/about/index.cfm?id=1980 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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to publicly disclose all their political spending, 38% were unaware that political
spending does not require board approval, and 41% did not know that trade
associations are not required to disclose their corporate members or the benefi-
ciaries of their political expenditures.100 In that same survey, 60% of those
directors supported requiring board oversight of political expenditures.101
These numbers reflect that many directors support more oversight of corporate
political expenditures, but overestimate their legal obligations concerning cor-
porate political expenditures.
A November 2011 study conducted by Sustainable Investments Institute
(“Si2”)102 and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute
(“IRRC”)103 found that only seven companies (Conoco Phillips, Gilead Sci-
ences, Goldman Sachs, CitiGroup, Ford, Kroger, and Microsoft) mention inde-
pendent political expenditures in their stated policies.104 However, as of
October 2011, forty-three Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 100 companies disclosed at
least some information about their indirect spending on their corporate web-
sites.105 Twenty-four S&P 100 companies explicitly stated on their websites
that they would not make independent expenditures.106 Those numbers appear
to indicate that a growing number of companies are realizing the importance of
disclosure.
In April 2011, the Los Angeles Times compiled a study on corporate polit-
ical spending and awarded ratings based upon political spending trans-
parency.107 The study “reviewed how the 75 largest publicly traded companies
in the energy, healthcare and financial services sectors disclose their political
giving on their corporate websites.”108 “Companies were asked about three
kinds of political spending—standard political giving to candidates and cam-
paigns, giving to trade associations and giving to other tax-exempt issue advo-
100 CORPORATE POLITICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 19.
101 Id.; but see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:
Who Decides? 6 (Harv. Law & Economics, Discussion Paper No. 676, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670085 (“A recent survey reported that, among the one hundred
largest public companies in the United States, only thirty-four require board-level approval
of political contributions.”).
102
“The Sustainable Investment Institute (Si2), a non-profit organization based in Washing-
ton, D.C., conducts impartial research and publishes reports on organized efforts to influence
corporate behavior on social and environmental issues.” SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INSTI-
TUTE, http://www.siinstitute.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
103 IRRC is a non-profit organization that funds environmental, social and corporate govern-
ance research, as well as the capital market context that impacts how investors and compa-
nies make decisions. IRRC INSTITUTE, http://www.irrcinstitute.org (last visited Nov. 16,
2012); see also IRRC Grant Funding, IRRC INSTITUTE, http://www.irrcinstitute.org/about.
php?page=grants&nav=3 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
104 Welsh & Young, supra note 90, at 81–84.
105 CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITI-
CAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE: HOW LEADING COMPANIES NAVIGATE POLITICAL
SPENDING IN THE WAKE OF Citizens United 5 (2011), available at http://www.political
accountability.net/index.php?ht=A/GetDocumentAction/i/5800.
106 Id.
107 Kim Geiger et al., Corporate Political Transparency Ratings, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2011), http://spreadsheets.latimes.com/corporate-transparency-ratings/.
108 Id.
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cacy groups . . . .”109 All the information provided by the surveyed companies
was checked against their corporate websites and financial filings.110 Compa-
nies such as Aetna, Humana, American Electric Power, and Exelon, received
high ratings for the level of transparency of their political expenditures.111
Companies such as Travelers, Murphy Oil, JP Morgan Chase, Halliburton, and
Goldman Sachs, all received low ratings for the level of transparency of their
political expenditures.112
To address this lack of transparency in corporate political spending, the
Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending113 in 2011 submitted
a petition to the SEC to “develop rules to require public companies to disclose
to shareholders the use of corporate resources for political activities.”114 The
petition outlines how shareholders are increasingly interested in receiving
information about corporate political spending and how transparency in corpo-
rate political spending helps ensure accountability.115 The petition contends
that for the procedures of corporate democracy to work, “shareholders must
have information about the company’s political speech; otherwise, shareholders
are unable to know whether such speech advances the corporation’s interest in
making profits.”116
1. Shareholder Proposals
In recent years, shareholder proposals117 concerning political expenditures
accounted for approximately 25% of the proposals filed, and approximately
33% of the resolutions voted on.118 The average support for political expendi-
ture proposals was 32.5%, up from 30.4% for similar proposals in 2010.119 For
the 2012 proxy season, Institute Shareholder Services (“ISS”)120 reported that
“[t]he number of resolutions on political issues top[ped] 100, for the first time
109 Corporate Political Transparency Ratings: The Times’ Methodology, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2011), http://spreadsheets.latimes.com/corporate-transparency-ratings/methodology/.
110 Id.
111 Geiger, supra note 107.
112 Id.
113 A group of ten academics whose teaching and research focus on corporate and securities
law. Petition for Rulemaking from Comm. on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending, to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y of the SEC (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/
2011/petn4-637.pdf.
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 Id.
117 Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 enables shareholders to request that the company
include their written proposals in the company’s proxy materials, for consideration at the
annual or special shareholders meeting to which the proxy materials relate. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a 8 (2011) (“A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that
the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a
meeting of the company’s shareholders.”).
118 TED ALLEN ET AL., 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT 27 (2011), available at http://www.
issgovernance.com/files/private/2011_US_PostSeason_Report_0929.pdf.
119 Id.
120 ISS is a provider of corporate governance solutions to the global financial community.
INSTITUTE SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), http://www.issgovernance.com (last visited Nov.
16, 2012).
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beating out the environment category as the top social issue proposed for proxy
consideration.”121
The main proponent for more transparency in corporate political expendi-
tures is the Center for Political Accountability (“CPA”). For the ninth consecu-
tive year, the CPA is asking companies to report their direct and indirect
political contributions.122 The CPA is asking for the companies to report on
“[p]olicies and procedures for political contributions and expenditures (both
direct and indirect) made with corporate funds” and “[m]onetary and non-mon-
etary contributions and expenditures (direct and indirect) used to participate or
intervene in any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candi-
date for public office, and used in any attempt to influence the general public,
or segments thereof, with respect to elections or referenda.”123
Other examples of shareholders proposing resolutions on political expend-
itures include NorthStar Asset Management, LLC (“NorthStar”)124 which is
asking companies to adopt a policy establishing “an annual proxy advisory vote
on the company’s political contribution policies and its planned electioneering
expenditures for the next fiscal year.”125 “NorthStar has submitted the resolu-
tion to Chubb, Google, Home Depot, Intel, Praxair, and Western Union.”126
Other proposed shareholder resolutions for the 2012 proxy season include a
proposal at Johnson & Johnson to require shareholder approval of contribu-
tions127 and proposals asking three companies (3M, Bank of America, and Tar-
get) to refrain from any political spending.128
2. Corporate Response
At corporations where shareholder proposals were introduced to require
additional reporting requirements concerning political expenditures, corpora-
tions have been hesitant to disclose those expenditures in public financial
reports. Some corporations have stated that the “collecting and posting of polit-
ical spending information is burdensome and of no interest to shareholders”
and that they may also “not want their competitors to have insight into their
political spending programs.”129
For example, The Boeing Co., in its 2010 proxy statement, argued that
reporting on its political expenditures would “impose unwarranted administra-
121 CAROLYN MATHIASEN & ERIK MELL, 2012 U.S. PROXY SEASON PREVIEW: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL & SOCIAL ISSUES 20 (Mar. 7, 2012), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/
private/2012USProxySeasonPreviewES.pdf [hereinafter 2012 ISS PREVIEW REPORT].
122 Id.
123 Id.
124
“NorthStar Asset Management specializes in the individual management of portfolios of
private clients, foundations, corporations, and institutions.” NORTHSTAR, http://www.north-
starmgt.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
125 2012 ISS PREVIEW REPORT, supra note 121, at 21.
126 Id.
127 Id. (“The corporation shall make no political contributions without the approval of the
holders of at least 75% of its shares outstanding.”).
128 Id. at 22. Bank of America shareholders argue that “continued political spending could
expose the company’s already[ ]battered brand to further risk, given its sizable political
footprint.” Id.
129 CORPORATE POLITICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 20.
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tive burdens on Boeing with no discernable [sic] benefit to shareholders.”130
Citigroup Inc., in its 2009 proxy statement, argued that disclosing its spending
through trade associations “would not provide stockholders with a greater
understanding of Citi’s strategies or philosophies about its political
contributions.”131
Valero Energy Corp., in its 2011 proxy statement, argued that any “addi-
tional reporting requirement . . . over and beyond the significant initiatives that
we have already put in place regarding disclosure of political contributions,
would serve no useful purpose, would be burdensome, could lead to misleading
representations of our political positions, and would result in unnecessary
expense.”132 Occidental Petroleum, in its 2011 proxy statement, argued that its
“aggregate political contributions are not financially material to the company
and anyone who desires to find information on Occidental’s political expendi-
tures could easily do so with a web search of public records. Therefore, provid-
ing an additional report is unnecessary.”133
These statements evidence a disconnect between directors and sharehold-
ers on the issue of transparency in corporate political spending. However, the
urgency for more transparency in this area has multiplied exponentially since
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. This issue also bears on a
corporation’s image as a “good corporate citizen.” “Shareholders have legiti-
mate interests in information about corporate policies and practices with respect
to . . . political contributions[,] . . . [and this issue] . . . bear[s] on the company’s
reputation as a good corporate citizen and consequently, the perceived integrity
of management and the board.”134 The issue of transparency will be discussed
in greater detail later in this Article.135
3. Shareholders’ Power to Discover Corporate Political Expenditures
Shareholders have certain powers to inspect corporate records to investi-
gate corporate political expenditures, even if a corporation does not disclose
those expenditures in public financial filings. Under Delaware law, sharehold-
130 THE BOEING CO., NOTICE OF 2010 ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 69
(2010). The statement also argued that “implementation of the proposal would place Boeing
at a competitive disadvantage by requiring the Company to reveal important elements of its
corporate strategy. Boeing’s competitors could use this information at our shareholders’
expense.” Id.
131 CITIGROUP INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 93 (2009) (“Although
Citi is a member of trade associations, the Citi Political Contributions Policy does not cover
our giving to trade associations. Because these associations operate independently of their
members and take a wide variety of positions on a number of matters, not all of which Citi
supports, disclosure of Citi’s contributions to these associations would not provide stock-
holders with a greater understanding of Citi’s strategies or philosophies about its political
contributions.”).
132 VALERO ENERGY CORP., NOTICE OF 2011 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 69
(2011).
133 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 79
(2011).
134 Ira M. Millstein, Holly J. Gregory & Rebecca C. Grapsas, Rethinking Board and Share-
holder Engagement in 2008, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 3 (2008), available at http://
www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=6382.
135 See infra Part VII.A.1.
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ers “have the right . . . to inspect for any proper purpose . . . [t]he corporation’s
stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records . . . .”136
Delaware courts have even urged shareholders to make a books-and-records
request before filing a complaint because it might prevent expensive and time-
consuming procedural issues that often occur in derivative litigation.137
Shareholders must be aware that they can, and should, file a books-and-
records request as a prerequisite to filing a derivative suit. In Khanna v. Covad
Communications Group, the Delaware Chancery Court held that the filing of a
derivative action did not preclude a shareholder from bringing an action seek-
ing disclosure of corporate records, since disclosure had originally been
demanded long before filing of the derivative action, and the derivative action
would not have been necessary if the corporation had properly responded to the
demand in a timely manner.138 In Paul v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc.,
the court found that what matters in proving a proper purpose under the books-
and-records-request statute is that the shareholder would have standing to bring
either direct or derivative claims against the corporation following the
requested inspection.139
“Proper purpose” has been defined as “a purpose reasonably related to the
demander’s interest” as a shareholder.140 In Paul, the Delaware Chancery
Court found that the shareholders had stated proper purposes for inspecting a
company’s books and records because the shareholders submitted evidence that
showed a “credible basis” to suspect waste and mismanagement.141 In Thomas
& Betts Corp. v. Leviton Manufacturing Co., the Delaware Supreme Court held
that even though shareholders must make specific and credible allegations suf-
ficient to warrant a suspicion of waste and mismanagement, shareholders were
not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that waste and mis-
management were actually occurring.142 For a demand to inspect corporate
records to be successful, shareholders need only establish “some credible basis”
to support an inference of corporate waste.143 The Delaware Supreme Court
136 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010).
137 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also
King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011) (“Delaware courts have
strongly encouraged stockholder-plaintiffs to utilize Section 220 before filing a derivative
action, in order to satisfy the heightened demand futility pleading requirements of Court of
Chancery Rule 23.1.”).
138 Khanna v. Covad Commc’n Grp., No. 20481-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11, at *10–16
(Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2004).
139 Paul v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., No. 6570-VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at
*18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2012).
140 Weisman v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 344 A.2d 267, 268 (Del. Ch. 1975); see also N.W.
Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 260 A.2d 428, 429 (Del. 1969).
141 Paul, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *13.
142 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 681 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Del. 1996).
143 See Freund v. Lucent Techs., No. 18893, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan.
9, 2003). See also Skouras v. Admiralty Enters., Inc., 386 A.2d 674, 678 (Del. Ch. 1978)
(“[M]ore than a general statement is required in order for the Court to determine the propri-
ety of a demand . . . .”); Helnsman Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. A & S Consultants, Inc., 525 A.2d
160, 165–66 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“A mere statement of a purpose to investigate possible general
mismanagement, without more, will not entitle a shareholder to broad § 220 inspection
relief. There must be some evidence of possible mismanagement as would warrant further
investigation of the matter.”).
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has noted that “the ‘credible basis’ standard sets the lowest possible burden of
proof.”144
B. Political Expenditures as Corporate Waste
1. Cases
Until recently, corporations were not allowed to engage in independent
political spending in federal elections.145 Because of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Citizens United, corporations are now allowed to spend unlimited sums
from their treasuries on advertisements that promote or oppose specific candi-
dates.146 Also, as noted above, shareholders are often unaware of political
spending by the corporation.147 Because of the laws in place prohibiting corpo-
rations from engaging in independent political spending and the lack of trans-
parency in corporate political spending, there is a dearth of case law on the
subject.
i. Stern v. General Electric Company
In Stern, a shareholder filed a derivative action against the directors of
General Electric Company (“GE”) alleging that they had expended large sums
from the corporation’s treasury for the support of the General Electric Political
Action Committee (“GE/PAC”).148 The shareholder’s complaint was that cor-
porate “funds had been used to support congressional incumbents without
regard to their past position on business issues, and that this practice was harm-
ful to the interests of GE’s shareholders.”149 On appeal, the district court had
dismissed the claims for corporate waste on the basis that the allegations of
corporate waste were preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(“FECA”).150
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that state law
claims for corporate waste based upon a corporation’s contributions to a federal
political campaign were not preempted and held that the FECA did “not pre-
clude New York from pursuing its independent interest in ensuring that corpo-
rate directors exercise sound judgment in the expenditure of corporate
funds.”151 However, the Second Circuit granted GE’s motion to dismiss the
claims for corporate waste, stating that the pleadings were “made upon ‘infor-
mation and belief’ and d[id] not identify with particularity the facts upon which
the belief [was] founded.”152 The Second Circuit held that under New York
law, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss . . . a shareholder derivative complaint
144 Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 123 (Del. 2006).
145 Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907). The Tillman Act made it a crime for
corporations to make financial contributions to candidates for federal office. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a) (2006) barred direct corporate contributions to the campaigns of federal political
candidates and also corporate independent expenditures on their behalf.
146 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
147 See supra Part IV.A.
148 Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Stern I), 924 F.2d 472, 473 (2d Cir. 1991).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 474.
151 Id. at 475.
152 Id. at 477.
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must allege that the directors acted fraudulently or in bad faith; allegations of
‘waste,’ standing alone, will not be enough.”153 The Second Circuit dismissed
the claims for corporate waste, but with leave to replead.154
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging “bad faith on the part of
defendants’ [sic] in their decisions to continue to expend corporate assets for
solicitation and administration costs of GE/PAC, which, [the] plaintiff
claim[ed], constituted an improper use and waste of corporate assets.”155 The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated that under
“New York law, ‘the essence of waste is the diversion of corporate assets for
improper or unnecessary purposes’ ”156 and that shareholders “must demon-
strate that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the
corporation received fair benefit.”157
The decision also stated that courts should make “a determination as to the
motives of corporate directors and any personal benefit they might receive in
their decisions to expend corporate assets” and that courts may infer that direc-
tors have improper motives or were recklessly indifferent to the stockholders’
interests “if there is great disparity in values between the assets expended and
the benefits received.”158 The New York court found that the allegations con-
tained in the amended complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff,159 sufficiently pleaded the required elements of a claim for corporate
waste.160 The court went on to state that it was not making any judgment as to
plaintiff’s likelihood of success and that the claim must succeed or fail after a
thorough discovery process.161
Discussing the merits of the claim for corporate waste, the court stated that
“to overcome [the] ‘business judgment rule’, a shareholder must show that ‘no
person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the corporation
received fair benefit’ in exchange for the challenged expenditure.”162 The
shareholders must also show that the directors acted with intent to serve some
outside interest, regardless of the consequences.163 The New York court laid
out a two-part test. First, a court will look at the “benefit to the corporation of
the challenged expenditures and the purpose of those expenditures.” Second, if
the evidence indicates “an improper purpose or that the corporation has not
received fair benefit, then the motives behind the corporate directors’ decisions
will be examined.”164
153 Id. at 476.
154 Id. at 477–78.
155 Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Stern II), No. 86 Civ. 4055 (MJL), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19091, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1991).
156 Id. at *12.
157 Id. at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
159 See Duncan v. AT & T Commc’ns, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1065 (2d Cir. 1985).
160 Stern II, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19091, at *14.
161 Id.
162 Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Stern III), 837 F. Supp. 72, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Aronoff
v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (1982)).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 77.
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The New York court first looked at the benefit derived by GE from the
corporation’s support of the GE/PAC. The plaintiff’s own expert testified that
the GE/PAC had been effective in building good will with members of Con-
gress.165 Witnesses also testified the benefits derived from support of GE/PAC
included “the involvement and education of GE employees on government rela-
tions[,] the election of candidates open to GE’s position on various issues[,] and
the maintenance and improvement of GE’s relationship with members of Con-
gress.”166 The New York court held that the plaintiff was unable to show an
absence of benefit to GE resulting from its support of GE/PAC’s operation.167
The New York court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
and held that the plaintiff had not shown the purpose of GE/PAC to be
improper and that the lawful and beneficial activities of GE/PAC did not result
in a waste of corporate assets.168
ii. Marsili v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company
In Marsili, shareholders brought a derivative action challenging a $10,000
contribution made by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“Pacific Gas”) to an
association advocating the defeat of a proposition appearing on a municipal
election ballot.169 The ballot initiative at issue would have prohibited construc-
tion in San Francisco of any building more than seventy-two feet in height
without prior approval of the voters.170 Pacific Gas argued that passage of the
initiative would have interfered with the construction of necessary company
facilities and raised property taxes.171 The shareholders argued that the contri-
bution was an ultra vires act and that the contributions were illegal.172 The trial
court entered summary judgment in favor of Pacific Gas.173 The California
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and found the contribu-
tion valid because it was neither gratuitous nor lacking corporate objective.174
The California Court of Appeals held that the directors have “discretionary
authority to enter into contracts and transactions which may be deemed reason-
ably incidental to its business purposes” and that “[w]hatever transactions are
fairly incidental or auxiliary to the main business of the corporation and neces-
sary or expedient in the protection, care and management of its property may be
undertaken.”175 “Neither the court nor minority shareholders can substitute
their judgment for that of the corporation ‘where its board has acted in good
faith and used its best business judgment in behalf of the corporation.’ ”176 The
court found that Pacific Gas had researched the initiative’s potential detrimental
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 79.
169 Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316–17 (1975).
170 Id. at 317 n.1.
171 Id. at 320–21.
172 Id. at 317.
173 Id. at 316.
174 Id. at 326, 328.
175 Id. at 323 (citing Davis v. Pac. Studios Corp., 258 P. 440, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
176 Id. at 324 (quoting Olson v. Basin Oil Co., 288 P.2d 952, 962 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
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effect on the corporation and had contributed the money based upon the belief
that defeating the proposition was in the best interests of the corporation.177
iii. The Supreme Court’s View
The Supreme Court has stated in multiple instances that shareholders have
the power to challenge corporate independent political expenditures. In First
National Bank of Boston v. Belloti, Justice Powell wrote that “[i]n addition to
intracorporate remedies, minority shareholders generally have access to the
judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements
alleged to have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further
the personal interests of management.”178 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion, stated that a corporation
“will risk a stockholder suit if it makes a political endorsement that is not plau-
sibly tied to its ability to make money for its shareholders.”179 Justice Brennan,
concurring with the majority’s decision, wrote that “shareholder actions against
corporate waste might serve as a remedy for other types of political expendi-
tures that have no legitimate connection to the corporation’s business.”180
Most importantly, in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy wrote that
“[s]hareholders can determine whether their corporation’s political speech
advances the corporation’s interest in making profits.”181 Justice Stevens, in a
dissenting opinion, wrote that
[t]he structure of a business corporation . . . draws a line between the corporation’s
economic interests and the political preferences of the individuals associated with the
corporation; the corporation must engage the electoral process with the aim “to
enhance the profitability of the company, no matter how persuasive the arguments for
a broader or conflicting set of priorities.”182
This line of cases reflects that even though the Supreme Court believes
that corporations have the power to spend unlimited sums from their treasuries
on advertisements that promote or oppose specific political candidates, the
Court also believes that if the expenditures are detrimental to the corporation,
shareholders have a judicial remedy based upon the corporate waste doctrine.
This is an important point for shareholders to make when challenging corporate
independent political expenditures.183
177 Id. at 325.
178 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
179 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
180 Id. at 678 (Brennan, J., concurring).
181 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
182 Id. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for American Independent Business
Alliance as Amicus Curiae 11); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1992) (“[A] corporation
. . . should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing
corporate profit and shareholder gain.”).
183 See infra Part V(A)(1).
Fall 2012] POST-CITIZENS UNITED 155
V. CHALLENGING CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDITURES
It is important to remember that “while companies do not have political
preferences, their managers do.”184 “Managers may have personal preferences
over candidates and parties they wish to support that are simply unrelated to the
firm’s activities.”185 Problems arise when political preferences prompt deci-
sions that negatively affect the corporation.
A. Shareholder Arguments
Based upon the cases cited above and the current law concerning share-
holder derivative claims, this Article suggests arguments shareholders should
make when challenging independent political expenditures. These arguments
include alleging that the independent political expenditures damage the corpo-
ration and decrease shareholder return, that the expenditures are in effect corpo-
rate gifts, that they are not charitable, and that they serve no corporate purpose.
1. Independent Political Expenditures Damage Corporations
Independent political expenditures may damage corporations, both
socially and economically, and lead to additional unintended costs for the cor-
poration. “Taking controversial and highly visible political stands can poten-
tially cost clients and therefore lead to financial costs. . . . A rise in overt, direct
political action by most corporations carries with it risks far exceeding the
political gains that might be achieved by acting through other agents.”186 Inde-
pendent political expenditures “may [also] result in the loss of customers,
employee dissatisfaction, or shareholder agitation in the form of proxy
fights.”187
As noted above, “political contributions . . . bear on the company’s reputa-
tion as a good corporate citizen.”188 Also, because of “greater political activism
by trade groups and demands by candidates and causes for corporate money,
boards are now seeing that their corporate image could be tarnished if these
contributions or political activities go awry.”189 “Imprudent donations can
potentially have a major negative impact on company reputations and business
184 Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke & Tracy Wang, Corporate Political Contributions:
Investment or Agency? 3 (AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper, Working Paper, Apr. 5,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670.
185 Id. at 10.
186 Justin J. Wert, Ronald Keith Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock, III, Of Benedick and Bea-
trice: Citizens United and the Reign of the Laggard Court, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
719, 727 (2011) (citing Michele Micheletti et al., Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring
Political Consumerism Past and Present, 84 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 123, 123–25 (2008); Diet-
lind Stolle, Marc Hooghe & Michele Micheletti, Politics in the Supermarket: Political Con-
sumerism as a Form of Political Participation, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 245, 245–69
(2005)).
187 Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech: Did the Supreme
Court Enhance Political Discourse or Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 95–96
(2010).
188 Millstein, supra note 134, at 3.
189 Leslie Wayne, Corporations to Disclose Political Contributions, N.Y. TIMES BLOG
(May 29, 2008, 12:49 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/29/corporations-to-
disclose-political-contributions/.
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if they don’t carefully and fully assess a candidate’s positions.”190 Corporations
might contend that this argument is theoretical and can be avoided by greater
due diligence in selecting which candidates receive funding. However, inde-
pendent political expenditures have already tarnished the reputations of some
corporations.
For example, in November 2010, Target Corp. (“Target”) and Best Buy
Corp. (“Best Buy”) each provided money, $150,000 and $100,000 respectively,
to MN Forward, a group that ran TV ads supporting state legislator Tom
Emmer’s gubernatorial bid in Minnesota.191 Mr. Emmer was a conservative
candidate who opposed same-sex marriage.192 Groups and activists supportive
of same-sex marriage condemned the donation and even called for boycotts of
Target stores.193
Target defended the expenditure, stating that the corporation supported
Emmer’s position on job growth and the state’s economy.194 Target’s CEO,
Gregg Steinhafel, wrote that “Target has a history of supporting organizations
and candidates, on both sides of the aisle, who seek to advance policies aligned
with our business objectives, such as job creation and economic growth.”195
However, with the loss of business caused by the outrage over the donation and
reputational harm done, Target was unable to defend the donation as a good
business decision and did not provide evidence of any increased profits or
increased shareholder returns attributable to the political expenditures. As noted
above, based upon these independent political expenditures, Target sharehold-
ers proposed a resolution asking the corporation to refrain entirely from politi-
cal spending.196
Support for political candidates is not the only type of independent politi-
cal expenditure that has damaged corporations. Valero Energy Corporation,
Tesoro Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum spent $4 million, $1.5 million,
and $300,000 respectively, on California’s Proposition 23,197 a ballot initiative
to suspend California’s global warming law.198 Because of Tesoro’s support of
Proposition 23, shareholders at Tesoro filed a resolution to request greater dis-
190 Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target Faces Investor Backlash; Large Share-
holders Demand the Retailer Revamp Its Political Contribution Process, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2010, at A1.
191 Target Spending Company Money on Candidates, CBS NEWS (Nov. 2, 2010, 8:21 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/27/politics/main6717307.shtml?tag=ContentMain;
contentBody.
192 Protecting Life and Marriage, EMMER FOR GOVERNOR, http://www.emmerforgovernor.
com/issues/socialvalues/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
193 Target Spending Company Money on Candidates, supra note 191.
194 Emily Friedman, Target, Best Buy Angers Gay Customers By Making Contribution to
GOP Candidate, ABC NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/target-best-
buy-fire-campaign-contributions-minnesota-candidate/story?id=11270194.
195 Id.
196 2012 ISS PREVIEW REPORT, supra note 121, at 22.
197 Green Century Pressures Occidental over California Prop 23 Support, GREEN CENTURY
FUNDS (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.greencentury.com/news/news/Green_Century_Pressures
_Occidental_over_California_Prop_23_Support [hereinafter GREEN CENTURY FUNDS].
198 Margot Roosevelt, Proposition 23: Backers were Outspent, Out-organized, L.A. TIMES
BLOG (Nov. 2, 2010, 11:28 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/11/pro-
position-23-defeat-global-warming-climate-change-initiative.html.
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closure and oversight of political expenditures.199 Laura Campos, director of
shareholder activities at the Nathan Cummings Foundation,200 stated that
Tesoro’s shareholders were “concerned that Tesoro’s support for the highly
controversial Proposition 23 could lead to a decrease in shareholder value by
damaging the company’s reputation and negatively impacting the business
environment in a state where Tesoro has significant operations.”201 Moreover,
Tesoro’s support for Proposition 23 prompted journalists to dig into the com-
pany’s environmental record, resulting in news reports that described Tesoro as
a “major polluter”202 and one of the nation’s “worst toxic polluters.”203 It is
also worth noting that Proposition 23 did not pass.204
What would have been the most likely outcome had Tesoro’s shareholders
filed a derivative suit claiming that the $1.5 million in independent political
expenditures supporting Proposition 23 was a waste of corporate assets? The
facts here are drastically different than the facts in Stern.205 In Stern, the court
found that support of the GE/PAC had been effective in building good will with
members of Congress and had educated employees on government relations.206
In the case at hand, Tesoro derived no net benefit from the independent politi-
cal expenditures. After all, the Proposition failed to pass, so Tesoro did not
receive the consideration that was presumably the goal of its expenditures.207
Furthermore, based upon the controversial nature of Proposition 23 and
the subsequent negative publicity stemming from support of the law, Tesoro’s
shareholders could argue that Tesoro did not adequately research the impact
those independent political expenditures would have on Tesoro’s reputation,
even if Proposition 23 would have passed. By contrast, Pacific Gas prevailed
against the derivative suit in Marsili in large part because prior to funding the
campaign aimed at defeating a state proposition, Pacific Gas had researched the
impact that passage of the proposition would have had on the corporation.208
For a recent example of damage to corporate reputation, companies such
as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have withdrawn their support for the American Leg-
islative Exchange Council (ALEC).209 “ALEC promotes business-friendly leg-
199 GREEN CENTURY FUNDS, supra note 197.
200 The Nathan Cummings Foundation is a non-profit organization that provides grants and
provides proxy-voting guidelines to shareholders. The Foundation is an institutional share-
holder at Tesoro. NATHAN CUMMINGS FOUNDATION, http://nathancummings.org/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2012).
201 GREEN CENTURY FUNDS, supra note 197.
202 C. Johnson, Report: Prop 23 Supporters Are Major Polluters, ABC NEWS 10 (Aug. 10,
2010, 3:42 PM), http://www.news10.net/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=90373.
203 Jakada Imani, The Color of Prop 23, S.F. GATE BLOG (Oct. 1, 2010), http://blog.sfgate.
com/imani/2010/10/01/the-color-of-prop-23/.
204 See Roosevelt, supra note 198.
205 Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Stern III), 837 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
206 Id.
207 The Article discusses this point later in the Article and contends that the independent
political expenditures would amount to nothing more than corporate gifts. See infra Part
V.A.2.
208 Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 325 (1975).
209 Peter Overby, Boycotts Hitting Group Behind “Stand Your Ground”, NPR (Apr. 5,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/05/150013705/boycotts-hitting-group-behind-stand-
your-ground.
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islation in state capitols and drafts model bills for state legislatures to adopt.”210
However, the organization has also supported “controversial measures, includ-
ing voter-identification laws and stand[-]your[-]ground laws.”211 Because of
the outcry caused by these laws, Kraft and Coca-Cola were urged to withdraw
support from ALEC, and subsequently had to make public statements affirming
that they would no longer support the group.
i. Decrease in Shareholder Return
To support a derivative suit, shareholders can also argue, rightfully, that
empirical studies have shown that corporate independent political expenditures
correlate with lower shareholder returns. A November 2011 study of 12,000
firms found that despite corporate managers’ attempts to increase firm value
through spending on elections, corporate political spending correlates with
lower shareholder value.212 The study found that corporations that made inde-
pendent political expenditures had “operating characteristics consistent with the
existence of a free cash flow problem,”213 and that increased expenditures low-
ered shareholder return.214 The study also found that corporations with larger
political expenditures evidenced worse corporate governance.215 Moreover, the
study found no positive effect of donating to winners in presidential or congres-
sional elections216 and generally found that donating to either winners or losers
is associated with returns that are worse than the returns associated with not
donating at all.217
The question of whether there has been a waste of corporate assets is a
question of fact and does not rest upon any hard-and-fast rule.218 However,
shareholders have a much stronger argument when relying on empirical evi-
dence showing that political expenditures generally lead to lower shareholder
returns.
ii. Lack of Due Diligence
Shareholders can also argue that their corporation failed to be duly diligent
with its independent political spending. These expenditures are generally made
without any due diligence. In Marsili, the court found the political expenditures
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 18, at 9.
213 Aggarwal, supra note 184, at 2.
214 Id. See also Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1130 n.67 (2011) (citing John C. Coates, IV,
Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United
Have on Shareholder Wealth? 16 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., and Bus., Dis-
cussion Paper No. 684), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680861 (“[C]orporate politi-
cal activity correlate[s] with weak corporate governance, it also correlates (negatively) with
firm value. Firms with corporate governance provisions giving shareholders more power to
engage in less political activity. Corporations that engage in political activity generate lower
value for their shareholders relative to the value of the assets they control.”)).
215 Aggarwal, supra note 184, at 2.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 27 (Del. Ch. 1982).
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to be valid, in part, because Pacific Gas had researched the detrimental effect
the ballot initiative would have had on the corporation and made the contribu-
tion based upon its belief that the contribution was in the best interests of the
corporation.219 Shareholders can cite to examples such as the Target and
Tesoro situations, discussed earlier in the Article, to show that companies must
be aware of the possible negative consequences of making independent politi-
cal expenditures.220
2. Independent Political Expenditures as Corporate Gifts
Shareholders can argue that corporate independent political expenditures
are, in effect, corporate gifts. A corporate gift is a payment that is completely
unsupported by consideration.221 Courts examine whether the payment was so
unreasonably disproportionate to the benefits created by the exchange that a
reasonable person would think the corporation did not receive any benefit.222
“When a director or officer removes or diverts corporate assets for which the
corporation receives no benefit, then the director or officer breaches the duty of
loyalty and is liable for waste of corporate assets.”223 In Orloff v. Shulman, a
Delaware court held that corporate waste exists when a benefit is “so inade-
quate that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would deem it worth
that which the corporation paid.”224 In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Trustees,
Inc., the Utah Supreme Court upheld a $5,000 charitable donation and held that
a contribution will be valid as long as it is “designed to assure a present or
foreseeable future benefit to the corporation.”225 Delaware courts also
“adhere[ ] to the well[-]settled common law principles of corporate law that
‘directors have no power to give away corporate property,’ and that a gift of
corporate assets requires unanimous stockholder approval.”226
An example of political spending that can potentially be labeled a corpo-
rate gift is Tesoro’s support of California Proposition 23, which was discussed
earlier in this Article.227 Tesoro spent $1.5 million in support of a ballot initia-
tive that ultimately failed.228 Tesoro appears to have no good argument that it
received any consideration for the expenditure. Shareholders can argue that
Tesoro spent $1.5 million and received nothing in return; therefore, the political
expenditure was in effect a corporate gift.229 Shareholders can further distin-
219 Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 326 (1975).
220 See supra Part V(A)(1).
221 Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979).
222 Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Fidanque v. Am.
Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch. 1952)).
223 Henderson v. Axiam, Inc., No. 96-2572-D, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 580, at *162
(Mass. Super. Ct. June, 22 1999) (citing Coggins v. New Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc.,
397 Mass. 525, 537 (1986)).
224 Orloff v. Shulman, No. Civ. A. 852-N, 2005 WL 3272355, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23,
2005).
225 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trs., Inc., 329 P.2d 398, 402 (Utah 1958).
226 Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179, 211–12 (D. Del. 1960).
227 See supra Part V(A)(1).
228 GREEN CENTURY FUNDS, supra note 197; see also Margot Roosevelt, Prop. 23 Battle
Marks New Era in Environmental Politics, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2010), http://articles.latimes.
com/2010/nov/04/local/la-me-global-warming-20101104.
229 See Orloff, 2005 WL 3272355, at *11 n.75.
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guish from the facts of Wrigley because Tesoro suffered reputational damage
by supporting a controversial ballot initiative.230
Shareholders can also argue that independent political expenditures do not
reasonably assure that the corporation will receive the benefits contemplated by
those expenditures.231 In Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, a stock option
plan was held to be invalid when the option could be exercised immediately
after its issuance. There was nothing in the plan which reasonably assured the
corporation that it would receive the benefits contemplated by it.232 Sharehold-
ers can analogize the giveaway in Kerbs to corporations’ independent political
expenditures. They can also argue that just as with stock option plans that can
be exercised immediately, independent political expenditures cannot be reason-
ably certain to provide the benefit corporations seek by making the
expenditures.
Shareholders can emphasize that unlike some market conditions that can
be predicted with some certainty,233 a political candidate’s platform to get
elected could vary drastically from what the politician actually accomplishes in
office. Shareholders can argue that political candidates’ positions on issues in
the past can, and often do, change based upon the political climate. For exam-
ple, assume that a car manufacturer spends $5 million on advertisements sup-
porting a candidate for President of the United States, because that candidate
has stated his support for the automobile manufacturing industry.234 What, if
any, assurance does the corporation have that the candidate will still favor the
auto industry once that candidate becomes President? Moreover, what if the
candidate does not win the election? Shareholders can rightfully argue that if
the candidate does not win the election, the corporation is deprived of any
intended benefit of the independent political expenditures, i.e., the election of
the candidate as president and his favorable support for the automobile indus-
try. Shareholders might even be able to argue that the money spent against the
eventual winner made him and his administration even less likely to propose or
support legislation and policies favored by the company and the auto industry
as a whole.
Shareholders may face difficulty when bringing these claims because
courts have generally found themselves to be “ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the
‘adequacy’ of consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge
appropriate degrees of business risk.”235 However, when the board of directors’
decision cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose, a court may substi-
230 See Johnson, supra note 202; see also Imani, supra note 203.
231 See Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952).
232 Id. at 657.
233 For example, if prices of crude oil rise, consumers and investors can expect gas prices to
rise along with it. Another example is that when a company announces lower than expected
earnings, its stock price can be expected to drop.
234 The $5 million figure is realistic in light of other companies’ actual expenditures. Aetna
Inc., for example, spent more than $11 million in lobbying and political expenditures in
2011. See Sean P. Carr & Wayne Dalton, Aetna Led Insurers in 2011 Lobbying Spending,
Funded Pro-GOP Group, SNL FINANCIAL (June 4, 2012), http://www.citizensforethics.org/
page/-/PDFs/Legal/Letters/6-14-12_Aetna_Letter_Exhibits.pdf?nocdn=1.
235 In re The Limited, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, *33
(Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002).
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tute its judgment for that of the board.236 Therefore, shareholders must allege
that the independent political expenditures “[were] so completely bereft of con-
sideration that [they] effectively constituted a gift.”237
3. Independent Political Expenditures Are Not Charitable
Shareholders should argue that independent political expenditures are not
made for the purpose of benefitting the community and do not generate “good
will.” This is an essential distinction shareholders need to make when challeng-
ing independent political expenditures. It is important for shareholders to note
that corporate political expenditures are not treated like charitable contributions
under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).238
Corporate political expenditures are taxed under the IRC, Section 162.239
Corporate political expenditures such as lobbying activities, independent politi-
cal expenditures, and indirect political expenditures are all non-deductible
under the provisions of the IRC.240
This is an important distinction. The legislature and the courts view chari-
table contributions much differently than political expenditures. For example,
in Cammarano v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a Treasury Regula-
tion that denied business expense deductions for political expenditures.241 In
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, the Supreme Court held that Congress
was not required by the First Amendment to subsidize political expenditures.242
Justice Rehnquist has even written, albeit in a dissent, that “[i]t cannot be so
readily concluded that the right of political expression is equally necessary to
carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes.”243
Furthermore, the shareholders’ argument for waste of corporate assets is
stronger for corporate political speech than it is for charitable contributions
because political expenditures are not tax-deductible, whereas charitable contri-
butions may be.244
The non-tax deductible status of political expenditures should be a critical
point made by shareholders when challenging the validity of independent polit-
ical expenditures. Shareholders should use the reasoning in the Kahn and Hen-
derson cases to support their argument. In Kahn, the court’s finding that the
donation was reasonable was based, in part, on the tax benefits to the corpora-
236 See Frankel v. Am. Film Techs., 675 N.Y.S.2d 837, 840 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); see also
McDermott v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 378, 383 (2000).
237 The Limited, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *33 (quoting Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000
Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *19–20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000)).
238 Compare I.R.C. § 162(e) (2006) (political expenditures), with I.R.C. § 170 (2006) (char-
itable contributions).
239 I.R.C. § 162(e).
240 See id.; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 529,
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS 16 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p529.
pdf (Corporations cannot “deduct contributions made to a political candidate [or] campaign
committee.”).
241 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
242 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983).
243 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
244 Compare I.R.C. § 162(e) (2006) (political expenditures), with I.R.C. § 170 (2006) (char-
itable contributions).
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tion.245 In Henderson, the court found that the charitable contribution was rea-
sonable because the tax deduction conferred a benefit upon the corporation.246
Corporations will also have a hard time arguing that independent political
expenditures generate “good will” in the community. As discussed earlier in the
Article, many independent political expenditures are not reported to sharehold-
ers or the business community, whereas charitable contributions are generally
extolled in the corporation’s annual report or in some other form of public
notice.247 In Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court held that a refusal to make charitable donations “might
bring on the loss of the good will of the community it serves, while other busi-
nesses make donations for worthy causes.”248 In Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
the Utah Supreme Court held that “[c]orporate donations create good will in the
community.”249 This author found no case where a court has stated that by not
making independent political expenditures, a corporation will lose “good will”
in the community, and, as evidenced earlier in this Article, controversial politi-
cal expenditures may even damage a corporation’s reputation.250
4. Independent Political Expenditures Serve No Corporate Purpose
Shareholders can argue that independent political expenditures have no
corporate purpose and that the expenditures are, in fact, examples of corporate
officers and directors using corporate treasury funds to further their own per-
sonal political goals and therefore these expenditures are prohibited. In Stern,
the court not only looked at the benefit to the corporation provided by the
challenged expenditures, but also the purpose of those expenditures.251
Even though directors have wide discretion to run the corporation, courts
have found that “a judge does his duty by ensuring that business decisions,
whatever their merit, were undertaken by a director without consideration of his
self-interest or for the sake of some third-party.”252 The court in In re
INFOUSA also held that
a skilled litigant, and particularly a derivative plaintiff, recognizing the institutional
advantages and competency of the judiciary reflected in [Delaware] law, places
before the Court allegations that question not the merit’s [sic] of a director’s decision,
a matter about which a judge may have little to say, but allegations that call into
doubt the motivations or the good faith of those charged with making the
decision.253
In Guth v. Loft, the court stated that corporate officers and directors have
the “duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation com-
mitted to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work
245 Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991).
246 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
247 Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1495, 1563 (2005) (“The visibility of corporate political activity, on an issue specific basis,
is happenstance and sporadic, depending largely on individual press reports.”).
248 Bd. of Supervisors v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 87 S.E.2d 139, 149 (Va. 1955).
249 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trs., Inc., 329 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1958).
250 See supra Part V(A)(1).
251 Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Stern III), 837 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y 1993).
252 In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2007).
253 Id.
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injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage.”254 Sharehold-
ers, therefore, should focus on directors’ motivations behind independent politi-
cal expenditures made in support of political candidates.
Shareholders can also argue that courts may infer directors’ adverse inter-
ests in their failure to disclose political expenditures to the shareholders and the
public. As noted above, “[p]olitical contributions are generally not disclosed to
the board or shareholders, nor are political expenditures generally subject to
oversight as part of a corporation’s internal controls.”255 In Feinberg Testamen-
tary Trust v. Carter, shareholders brought a derivative action for breach of
fiduciary duty in connection with the corporation’s repurchase of stock.256 The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the adverse
interest of the directors was
indicated by their subsequent failure to disclose the . . . transaction to the public and
the shareholders. If the directors had believed the [transaction] represented an appro-
priate expenditure of corporate funds, one would have expected the directors to
announce the full details of the transaction to shareholders. Instead, the directors
followed a continued policy of refusing to discuss . . . the transaction.257
In a derivative suit, shareholders should emphasize any lack of trans-
parency of corporate independent political expenditures and aim to persuade
the court to view the corporate independent political expenditures “as . . . atypi-
cal situation[s] where the self-interest of corporate directors may well have
dominated other considerations.”258
VI. ISSUES FOR THE COURTS
Because of Citizens United and increased corporate political spending,
courts will begin to see more shareholder derivative claims challenging inde-
pendent political expenditures.259 This section analyzes issues that will arise for
courts when deciding these cases. These issues include defining, on a case-by-
case basis, what a “benefit” to the corporation is and also determining whether
the challenged corporate political expenditure had a “corporate purpose.” This
section also suggests approaches courts can take when deciding these cases. In
Stern, the court formulated a two-part test for analyzing political expendi-
tures.260 The test is a good starting point, but Stern was decided in the pre-
Citizens United era and could not foresee corporations making independent
254 Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
255 Fisch, supra note 96, at 1613.
256 Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F. Supp. 1066, 1068–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
257 Id. at 1074. This premise has also been adopted by courts in Delaware. See Grobow v.
Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 923 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“of considerable significance, the . . . directors [in
Feinberg] had failed to disclose the [transaction] . . . in proxy materials sent to shareholders,
causing the District Court to observe that, had the directors believed that the . . . transaction
represented ‘an appropriate expenditure of corporate funds, one would have expected [them]
to announce the full details . . . to shareholders.’ ”).
258 Feinberg, 652 F. Supp. at 1075.
259 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 22, at 14.
260 Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co. (Stern III), 837 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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political expenditures from the corporate treasury in the amounts we have seen
in the past two years.261
A. Defining “Benefit” to the Corporation
The first and most challenging question courts will face is how to define if
a corporation receives a benefit from an independent political expenditure. A
good place to start is to look at the definition of “benefit.” Ballentine’s Law
Dictionary defines “benefit” as “whatever adds value to property; advantage;
profit . . . or enhances the value of . . . property rights.”262 Black’s Law Dic-
tionary defines “benefit” as an “advantage,” “privilege,” “profit,” or “gain.”263
As stated earlier in this Article, courts examine whether payments were so
unreasonably disproportionate to the benefits created by the exchange that a
reasonable person would think the corporation did not receive any benefit.264
This issue is made more complicated by the fact that the benefits derived from
independent political expenditures are not always immediately apparent. Courts
have also voiced their reluctance to “second-guess” the decision-making pro-
cess of corporate directors.265 However, courts have implied that they might
substitute their judgment for that of the board of directors if the board’s deci-
sion cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose.266
When looking at claims alleging corporate waste, courts must decide
whether a corporation received a benefit for political expenditures. The court
can impose a “reasonable person” standard as outlined in INFOUSA267 and
Lewis v. Vogelstein.268 The court in INFOUSA held that courts must “apply a
reasonable person standard and deny a claim of waste wherever a reasonable
person might deem the consideration received adequate.”269 The court further
held that
[w]hen this difficult standard is applied in the liberal context of a motion to dismiss,
in order for the complaint to survive the motion, the Court must find that in any of
the possible sets of circumstances inferable from the facts alleged under the com-
plaint, no reasonable person could deem the received consideration adequate.270
261 See Schouten, supra note 23; see also Dan Eggen, Most Independent Ads for 2012 Elec-
tion Are from Groups that Don’t Disclose Donors, WASH. POST (April 24, 2012, 6:28 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/most-independent-ads-for-2012-election-are-from-
groups-that-dont-disclose-donors/2012/04/24/gIQACKkpfT_story.html.
262 BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 131 (3d ed. 1969). See also Technomedical Labs, Inc.
v. Utah Sec. Div., 744 P.2d 320, 324 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Definition of benefit not limited
to monetary benefit.).
263 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 178 (9th ed. 2009).
264 See, e.g., Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Fidanque
v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch. 1952)).
265 See, e.g., In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 1806616, at
*14 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010) (“While hindsight is generally 20/20, it cannot be used to second
guess the business judgment of Delaware directors . . . .”).
266 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (citing
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
267 In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 1002 (Del. Ch. 2007).
268 Lewis v. Volgelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
269 In re INFOUSA, 953 A.2d at 1002 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech.,
Inc., 1999 WL 39547 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999)).
270 Id.
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The court in Vogelstein held that a claim for corporate waste requires alle-
gations of “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportion-
ately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be
willing to trade.”271
For courts to decide whether an independent political expenditure was
“reasonable,” courts should employ an approach analogous to the test devel-
oped in Henderson.272 In Henderson, the court held that the test to determine
the validity of a corporate donation is a test of reasonableness and that “the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corpo-
rations furnish a helpful guide.”273 The IRC provides that the total deductions
for a corporation for any taxable year shall not exceed 10% of the corporation’s
taxable income.274 Even though independent political expenditures are not tax-
deductible, the Henderson test could provide a starting point for the court’s
analysis.
Courts could also apply a cost-benefit analysis. In Henderson, the court
found that the small loss of immediate income, had it not been for the gift in
question, was far outweighed by the overall benefits from the gift.275 Courts
could examine whether a corporation performed any cost-benefit analysis
before making any independent political expenditure. Courts could employ the
use of experts to make determinations as to whether, based upon a cost-benefit
analysis, the corporate independent political expenditures were valid exercises
of business judgment.
Another approach the courts can take to ascertain whether independent
political expenditures are reasonable is a net loss test. This test is developed
from the net loss rule defined in Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.276 In Miller, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a shareholder
derivative suit must allege that a transaction caused independent damage to the
corporation.277 In Wrigley, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the sharehold-
ers’ claims failed, in part, because they did not allege any damage to the corpo-
ration stemming from the failure to install lights at Wrigley Park.278 For
shareholders to be successful under the net loss test, they must show that the
independent political expenditure damaged the corporation. Damage to the cor-
poration could include loss of profits, decreased shareholder return, or even
271 Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336; In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 656 (Del.
Ch. 2008) (“If given the facts pled in the complaint, ‘any reasonable person might conclude
that the deal made sense, then the judicial inquiry ends.’ ” (quoting Harbor Fin. Partners v.
Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Weiss
v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“[A] waste entails an exchange of corporate
assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any
reasonable person might be willing to trade.”).
272 See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); see also
supra Part III.B.3.
273 Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405.
274 I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2006).
275 Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405.
276 See Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1974).
277 See id. at 763 & n.5.
278 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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damage to the corporation’s image due to support of a political candidate.279
For example, both the Target and Tesoro situations described earlier in this
Article evidence the type of reputational harm that corporations can suffer from
making controversial independent political expenditures.280
B. Defining “Business Purpose”
The second question courts must answer is whether the independent politi-
cal expenditure was made for a “business purpose.” Directors and officers
should not spend corporate funds on political issues that further their political
objectives rather than those of the corporation.281
One approach the courts can take is the “in-the-line-of-business” test
drawn from Guth v. Loft.282 The definition of “in the line of business” is “not
within the field of precise definition, nor is it one that can be bounded by a set
formula. It has a flexible meaning, which is to be applied reasonably and sensi-
bly to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”283
Where a corporation is engaged in a certain business, and an opportunity is presented
to it embracing an activity as to which it has fundamental knowledge, practical expe-
rience and ability to pursue, which, logically and naturally, is adaptable to its busi-
ness having regard for its financial position, and is one that is consonant with its
reasonable needs and aspirations for expansion, it may be properly said that the
opportunity is in the line of the corporation’s business.284
For example, if a hard drive manufacturing corporation spent $500,000 on
advertisements supporting a candidate who had never shown great support for
the technology industry, or if the corporation spent that money on a candidate
who wanted to impose more regulation on that industry, the corporation will
have a hard time contending that the independent political expenditures were
for a valid “business purpose.”
Another approach the courts can take is drawn from a two-part test for
characterization of a transaction for tax purposes in Klamath Strategic Inv.
Fund v. United States.285 Under this approach, the first question courts have to
answer would be whether the independent political expenditure was made to
maximize profits. This analysis would be both objective and subjective.286 An
independent political expenditure would have a business purpose if there was
an objective reasonable opportunity for economic profit or benefit to corporate
reputation.287 The second question the courts would have to answer would be
whether the expenditure was motivated by something other than the political
ideology of the directors. As noted above, courts can infer director motivations
from the facts and circumstances of the corporate political expenditures.288
279 See Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah Sec. Div., 744 P.2d 320, 324 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (definition of “benefit” not limited to monetary benefit).
280 See supra Part V.A.1.
281 Fisch, supra note 96, at 1609–10.
282 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 514 (Del. 1939).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544–45 (5th Cir. 2009).
286 See id. at 544.
287 Gefen v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1471, 1490 (1986).
288 See Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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What we can learn from these tests is that the analyses for finding the
benefit of a corporate independent political expenditure and examining the
motivation behind making these expenditures will be closely intertwined. The
benefit and motivation questions will generally be decided upon the same set of
facts, and courts will have to look at the totality of the circumstances of the
expenditures, rather than looking at the expenditures piecemeal. Courts should
recognize that a corporate fiduciary should not serve both corporate and per-
sonal interests at the same time.289 “[C]orporate fiduciaries ‘owe their whole
duty to the corporation, and they are not to be permitted to act when duty
conflicts with interest. They cannot serve themselves and the corporation at the
same time.’ ”290
VII. IMPROVING CORPORATE POLITICAL EXPENDITURE POLICIES
Corporations can decrease the risk of facing a shareholder derivative com-
plaint by improving the transparency of independent political expenditures and
improving policies governing those expenditures. Corporations should have a
stated policy for political spending and also a committee that can monitor the
political expenditure program.
A. Proposed Model for Political Expenditures
The Center for Political Accountability (“CPA”) has constructed a “Model
Code of Conduct” for corporate political spending.291 Having a political spend-
ing model is very important for a corporation especially since
“[c]ompanies . . . have paid record fines, run up hefty legal bills and faced
reputational knocks . . . because of political expenditures.”292 The CPA cites a
study conducted in 2006 by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research (“Mason-Dixon
Study”) which “found that 85 percent of shareholders agreed that the ‘lack of
transparency and oversight in corporate political activity encourages behavior’
that threatens shareholder value and ‘puts corporations at legal risk.’ ”293 The
CPA cites to this study to illustrate the importance of a written corporate politi-
cal spending model.
The CPA Model Code provides suggestions for companies to improve
their policies concerning political expenditures.294 It provides suggestions for
improvement in areas such as, transparency, proper motivation, and proper
monitoring of political expenditures.295 The section below builds upon the
CPA Model Code, providing not only examples of companies whose corporate
289 Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Me. 1995).
290 Id.
291 See BRUCE F. FREED & JAMIE CARROLL, OPEN WINDOWS: HOW CODES OF CONDUCT
REGULATE POLITICAL SPENDING AND A MODEL CODE TO PROTECT COMPANY INTERESTS AND
SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2007), available at http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?
ht=A/GetDocumentAction/i/611 [hereinafter CPA MODEL CODE].
292 Id. at 1.
293 Id. (citing CTR. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING: A SUR-
VEY OF AMERICAN SHAREHOLDERS 6 (2006) (survey conducted by Mason-Dixon Polling &
Research).
294 Id. at 2.
295 See id.
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policies should be emulated, but also guidance on how to implement these poli-
cies in an effective and efficient manner.
1. Political Motivations
The fact that companies do not have political preferences—but their man-
agers and directors do—is not lost on shareholders.296 Nearly 75% of share-
holders “believe that corporate political spending is often undertaken to
advance the private political interests of corporate executives rather than the
interest of the company and its shareholders.”297 The CPA Model Code calls
for political activities of employees and management to be explicitly separated
in a corporation’s stated political giving policies.298
For example, Hewlett Packard Corporation’s (“HP”) contribution policy
encourages its “employees to be active in their communities,” but states that
“the company limits political activities on company time and premises.”299
Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”), states in its Code of Conduct that “[e]mployees
should not use the workplace to demonstrate their personal support for a partic-
ular political issue, party or candidate.”300
A codification of this policy could state the following: “The Corporation is
committed to being actively involved in the political process. The Corporation
will not make any direct independent expenditures on behalf of candidates run-
ning for public office unless there is a reasonable belief that the expenditures
will benefit The Corporation. Under no circumstances will independent politi-
cal expenditures be made to advance the private political interests of corporate
executives or directors.” This may seem like a common sense statement, but it
will serve as written notice so that an executive cannot later claim to have been
unaware of the corporation’s policy on political expenditures.
As an additional measure, for independent political expenditures exceed-
ing a certain dollar amount, corporations would be required to attach a short
statement affirming that expenditure’s purpose. For example, any independent
political expenditure greater than $25,000 should have a documented purpose.
Assume that a computer manufacturer spends $5 million on advertising to sup-
port a Congressional candidate. The corporation would state that it supported
the candidate because of his pledge to support the technology industry while in
office. As long as the candidate has actually pledged support for the technology
industry, this could negate later claims alleging that the political expenditures
were made for an improper purpose. These statements could be contained in a
secure database maintained by the corporation. The database would be accessi-
ble by the officers, directors, and legal counsel for the company.
296 Aggarwal, supra note 184, at 3.
297 CPA MODEL CODE, supra note 291, at 21.
298 Id.
299 HP Political Contributions Policies, HP.COM, http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/gov-
ernment/us/engagement/policies.html?jumpid=Reg_R1002_USEN (last visited Nov. 17,
2012).
300 MERCK, CODE OF CONDUCT 17 (3d ed.), available at http://www.merck.com/about/code
_of_conduct.pdf.
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2. Clearly Defined Criteria for Funds Spent on Political Activities
Corporations must have clearly defined criteria for making political contri-
butions. These criteria will lessen the chance that any independent political
expenditures will be challenged after the fact. HP has a model list of criteria for
deciding which political candidates to support.301
Corporations should first look at the support for their business priorities
and ask themselves, “Does this candidate support the corporation either directly
or indirectly by supporting the corporation’s industry?” The likelihood that the
candidate will support the corporation should be the main factor when deciding
whether to support a certain political candidate. The next criterion is whether
the candidate engages in bi-partisan activity.302 If the candidate has a record of,
or evinces a strong commitment toward, working with candidates on both sides
of the political spectrum, there is less chance that the candidate will be per-
suaded to vote along strict party lines.
Another criterion is that a corporation should favor moderate politicians
over partisan extremists.303 Only spending corporate funds to support moderate
candidates lessens the chance of donating to a polarizing political figure who
will stir up negative publicity or cause the corporation to lose public and share-
holder support. Additionally, to further reduce the chance of becoming
embroiled in scandals, corporations should only donate to politicians who have
shown high levels of ethics.304 If a corporation supports a politician who has
not shown high levels of ethics in the past, the corporation could be criticized
for its support.
Corporations should also use criteria to determine the amount of money
they spend on support for a candidate. The first criterion is the likelihood of
changing the outcome of a political contest. For example, a corporation should
not spend millions of dollars on a candidate who is so far behind in credible
pre-election polls that he is extremely unlikely to win. Outcomes of political
races do have frenetic swings; however, there will be closer scrutiny of large
amounts of money spent on candidates who have very little chance of winning.
In other words, the corporation needs to be able to show that it carefully picked
its battle and was not, in effect, throwing away money on a race that its candi-
date, in all likelihood, could not win. Another criterion is that if a candidate is
the incumbent, what leadership positions does he or she hold? For example, it
is more understandable for banks to support the re-election of an incumbent
who is chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs than it would be if those banks supported a candidate who does not hold
such a position. These are just some criteria that should determine whether
corporate funds should be spent to support a political candidate and the amount
that should be spent. As noted above, corporations must always remember that
the most important criterion will always be whether the candidate supports the
corporation either directly or indirectly.
301 HP Criteria for Assessing Candidates, HP.COM, http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/
government/us/engagement/criteria.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
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3. Public Disclosure of Corporate Funds Spent on Political Activities
“Investor activists want companies to disclose how they spend corporate
treasury money on politics not only because this is their money, but also
because of their generally-held [sic] belief that political spending can pose risks
to shareholder value.”305 The Mason-Dixon study found that 94% of sharehold-
ers want corporations to disclose all political expenditures.306 Transparency in
political spending can also discourage improper expenditures and promote
openness and honesty.307 The CPA Model Code calls for corporations to dis-
close all expenditures of corporate funds on political activities to
shareholders.308
Three major corporations provide examples of such disclosure efforts.
Publicly available pages of HP’s corporate website include a detailed chart of
political contributions.309 The chart lists the candidate, committee, or organiza-
tion receiving the political expenditure, the political party with which each is
affiliated, the district that a candidate would represent if elected, and the
amount of the political expenditure.310 The chart separates the expenditures by
state to make it easier to see where the expenditures are being made. Likewise,
Merck semi-annually posts political contributions categorized by state, candi-
date, and amount on its corporate responsibility website, which is available to
the public.311 Merck also discloses any political contributions to committees
known as 527 organizations312 and contributions to IRC section 501c(4) orga-
nizations.313 Since 2008, Merck has also disclosed the portion of dues that
major U.S.-based trade associations report to Merck as being used for advocacy
and/or political activities.314 Aetna Inc. (“Aetna”) takes a different approach,
305 Welsh & Young, supra note 90, at 31 (citing BRUCE F. FREED & JOHN C. RICHARDSON,
CTR. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE GREEN CANARY: ALERTING SHAREHOLDERS AND
PROTECTING THEIR INVESTMENTS 5 (2005), available at http://www.politicalaccountability.
net/index.php?ht=A/GetDocumentAction/i/920).
306 CPA MODEL CODE, supra note 291, at 21–22 (citing CTR. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY,
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN SHAREHOLDERS (2006) (survey
conducted by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research).
307 Id. at 21.
308 Id.
309 See HP Corporate Contributions, HP.COM, http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/govern-
ment/us/engagement/corporate.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
310 Id.
311 Transparency Disclosures, MERCK, http://www.merckresponsibility.com/focus-areas/
ethics-and-transparency/transparency-disclosures/home.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
312 Id. A political organization regulated under Section 527 of the IRC. The term “political
organization” means a “party, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether
or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indi-
rectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.”
I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2006).
313 Transparency Disclosures, supra note 311; I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006) (“[c]ivic leagues
or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social
welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the
employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earn-
ings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes”).
314 Transparency Disclosures, supra note 311.
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providing a yearly “Political Contributions and Related Activity Report” to the
public on its corporate website.315
Corporations should provide the public with an easily accessible, detailed
chart of political expenditures on their corporate websites. This chart would
allow corporations to easily distribute information concerning their political
expenditures to the public. Using the HP political expenditures chart as a tem-
plate, corporations should include all material information such as the candi-
date, committee, or organization receiving the political expenditure, the
political party with which each is affiliated, the targeted jurisdiction, and, of
course, the amount of the political expenditure. In addition to this information,
corporations’ website disclosure charts should include a written description of
the purpose for independent political expenditures greater than $25,000. This
chart will be very important for corporations to avoid shareholder derivative
lawsuits. As noted above, a lack of transparency can result in courts inferring
that improper motivations of directors underlie those directors’ independent
political expenditures.316
4. Monitoring Corporate Funds Spent on Political Activities
Corporations need to have mechanisms in place to monitor corporate
spending on political activity. The CPA Model Code calls for directors to over-
see corporate political spending, receive regular reports from corporate officers
responsible for the spending, and meet regularly with officers to review the
purpose of the expenditures.317 The need for such reports and meetings is
reflected in the findings of The Conference Board study, discussed earlier in
this Article: 73% of the directors surveyed wrongly believed that corporations
were required to report all their political spending, and 38% were unaware that
political spending does not require board approval.318
Examples of companies that have strong political expenditure monitoring
programs include The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams”), which requires
board approval for any company funds or assets used for political purposes.319
McDonald’s Corp. (“McDonald’s”) requires all political contributions to be
approved in advance by the head of its Government Relations Department.320
In addition, “any [p]olitical [c]ontributions to a single candidate, political party
or ballot initiative that will aggregate to more than . . . $100,000 in a calendar
year . . . require the approval of the McDonald’s area of the world president of
the market in which the contribution will be made.”321
315 AETNA PAC & AETNA INC., POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITY REPORT
(2009), available at http://www.aetna.com/about-aetna-insurance/document-library/pac/
2009-Aetna-PAC-annual-report.pdf.
316 See Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F. Supp. 1066, 1073–75 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
317 CPA MODEL CODE, supra note 291, at 24.
318 CORPORATE POLITICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 97, at 19.
319 WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT 8–9 (2012), available at http://wil-
liamscom.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/cbc.pdf.
320 Political Contribution Policy, ABOUTMCDONALDS.COM, http://www.aboutmcdonalds.
com/mcd/investors/corporate_governance/guidelines_and_policies/Political_Contribution_
Policy.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
321 Id.
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Corporations also should create a Political Spending Compliance Commit-
tee (“PSCC”) to implement and monitor corporation’s political expenditures.322
The PSCC should be led by a representative from a corporation’s law depart-
ment or office of the general counsel. It should be a cross-functional group of
executives that ensures all independent political expenditures are in compliance
with company policy, are reasonably assured of benefitting the corporation, and
serve a valid corporate purpose. No money should be spent on a political cam-
paign without prior approval from the corporation’s PSCC.
The PSCC also will be responsible for maintaining a database for all polit-
ical expenditures, including information concerning the purpose of independent
political expenditures greater than $25,000. The members of the PSCC must be
given specific training concerning political expenditures and must continually
attend trainings and seminars to stay abreast of current developments in the
area of campaign finance and political spending regulations and should meet
bi-monthly to discuss implementation of compliance and ethics initiatives.323
VIII. CONCLUSION
With its ruling in Citizens United, the Supreme Court cleared the way for
unlimited independent political expenditures by corporations. In 2012, the
Court had a chance to revisit the Citizens United holding, but refused to do so
and all attempts by Congress to limit or reverse Citizens United have failed to
date. One key question this raises is: Where does this leave shareholders?
“ ‘Corporate money’ in a publicly traded company is in part made up of invest-
ments from shareholders. Thus, corporate spending is[,] in reality[,] the spend-
ing of investors’ money[;]”324 and shareholders, therefore, have a strong
interest in not allowing the corporation to waste assets and expend large
amounts of corporate treasury funds in support of political candidates that do
not benefit the corporation. For these reasons, the issue of whether and how
shareholders may be able to control independent political expenditures will be
part of the legal discussion for the foreseeable future.
This Article has provided ample evidence that even though corporations
have the ability to make independent political expenditures, it is not always in
their best interest to do so. Moreover, this Article has discussed how sharehold-
ers may bring derivative claims to challenge corporate independent political
expenditures that they believe are detrimental to the corporation. After all,
shareholders are considered the “owners” of a corporation and therefore are
given rights at the expense of other corporation constituents.325
Granted, shareholders must meet a high burden for a claim of corporate
waste to succeed; however, by using the suggestions provided throughout this
322 This idea comes from an earlier article where I espoused the creation of a Charitable
Contributions Compliance Committee. See William Alan Nelson II, No Good Deed Goes
Unpunished: Charitable Contributions and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 17 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 54 (forthcoming Spring 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1884283.
323 Id.
324 See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 18, at 5.
325 Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2004).
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Article, shareholders have a much greater chance of success. Shareholders can
argue that empirical studies have shown that corporate independent political
spending leads to lower shareholder return, that corporate independent political
spending serves no corporate purpose, that corporate political spending can
harm a corporation’s reputation, and that corporate political expenditures are
not treated like charitable contributions under the tax code.
On the other hand, corporations can also take steps to largely immunize
themselves from derivative suits that allege corporate waste based upon corpo-
rate political spending. Derivative suits are less likely to succeed if corporations
implement a comprehensive political spending program, specifically including
clear policies concerning oversight and disclosure of a corporation’s political
spending, and creation of a Political Spending Compliance Committee
(“PSCC”) to monitor the corporate political spending policies.
In conclusion, the debate over not just the merits and effectiveness of cor-
porate political spending, but about what limits should be imposed on such
spending, continues in several arenas, most visibly in the campaigns themselves
and in Congress. While that dialogue plays out, however, the debate can and
should be resolved in courtrooms and boardrooms. Those corporations that are
not transparent about their political spending, and cannot justify their indepen-
dent political expenditures as likely to benefit the corporation, will find them-
selves losing derivative suits filed by shareholders who are fighting for the best
interests of the corporation.
